By David J. Lonsdale
This booklet deals a strategic research of 1 of the main awesome army careers in background, choosing the main pertinent strategic classes from the campaigns of Alexander the good.
David Lonsdale argues that because the middle ideas of approach are everlasting, the research and research of historic examples have price to the trendy theorist and practitioner. additionally, as process is so complicated and demanding, the extraordinary occupation of Alexander offers the right chance to appreciate top perform in procedure, as he completed impressive and non-stop good fortune around the spectrum of conflict, in various conditions and environments. This ebook provides the 13 so much pertinent classes that may be realized from his campaigns, dividing them into 3 different types: grand technique, army operations, and use of strength. every one of those different types presents classes pertinent to the fashionable strategic setting. finally, although, the booklet argues that the dominant think about his good fortune used to be Alexander himself, and that it was once his personal features as a strategist that allowed him to beat the complexities of approach and attain his expansive objectives.
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Additional resources for Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy
22 Although for those in the front lines the experience of hoplite warfare could be horrific and bloody, casualties were fairly light. 24 As we will see later with the battles of Alexander, pursuit was the moment at which the greatest slaughter of the enemy could occur. Pursuit rarely happened in hoplite warfare for two main reasons. First, as part of the formulaic nature of this warfare it was sometimes commonly agreed by the belligerents that pursuit would not occur. Indeed, Victor Davis Hanson notes that ‘Ancient treaties among city states sometimes outlawed .
Miltiades needed to achieve victory on the plain at Marathon within three hours. In order to achieve the required rapid victory, Miltiades took a calculated risk with his battle formation. 52 If all went to plan, the centre would fall back, drawing the Persians forward into a trap. As they surged forward to finish the Greek centre, the stronger Greek forces on the flanks would begin to encircle the hapless Persians in a double envelopment manoeuvre. Of course, the main danger with such a plan comes from the possibility that the centre is so weak that rather than fall back it simply collapses, leaving the Greek flanks exposed.
The forces facing the Germans could not initially cope with these rapid coordinated attacks deep into their territories. However, history clearly shows that the Germans began to reap diminishing returns from their blitzkrieg operations. Germany was unable to maintain the levels of success they had achieved in the first three years of the war. This can be attributed to a number of factors, and is very significant in our analysis of RMAs. The weather and geographic depth of the Soviet Union neutralised many of the advantages conferred by blitzkrieg.
Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy by David J. Lonsdale